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Introduction: Liveness, Mediatization, and Glenn Gould's 
Recordings 
Live music does not exist without its recorded other. In other words, the 
concept of liveness in music was unknown until there was something not 
live-recordings-with which to compare it. Sarah Thornton describes 
the conventional ideology of liveness, which derived from a live/recorded 
binarism, as historically giving "positive valuation to ... performed music. 
[The word 'live'] soaked up the aesthetic and ethical connotations of 
life-versus-death, human -versus-mechanical, creative-versus-imitative ... 
Liveness became the truth of music, the seeds of genuine culture. Records, 
by contrast, were false prophets of pseudo-culture" (1995:42). Liveness, at 
least as historically constructed, signified the authenticity of human musical 
production and performance, always considered in contrast with the artifice 
of electronic reproductions. 
While this rather straightforward livelrecorded binarism still informs 
some Western concepts of liveness today, many recording and performance 
situations are far more complex than such a binarism will allow. So-called live 
recordings provide a simple example: on the one hand, those who listen to 
such recordings are not immersed in the same atmosphere of sights, smells, 
tactile sensations, or even sounds (because, despite the best intentions of its 
producers, no recording can ever exactly reproduce the sounds it supposedly 
captures) that the attending audiences experienced at the time of perform-
ancelrecording. On the other hand, the liveness of these recordings is thought 
to consist in their apparently faithful representations of performances that 
took place in the presence of these audiences. Television broadcasts, rock 
music performances, and various forms of electro acoustic music (among 
many other musical contexts) all similarly present mixtures of electronic 
mediation and some semblance ofliveness. 1 In many instances, then, liveness 
persists even within what I will call mediatized music, or more specifically 
mediatized performance. 
I borrow the term mediatized from Philip Auslander, who in turn bor-
rows it from Jean Baudrillard (1981) to indicate "that a particular cultural 
object is a product of the mass media or of media technology" (1999:5). 
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Auslander, like Baudrillard, recognizes the mass media as the dominant 
form of cultural production, and thus as a "vehicle of the general code 
in a way that live performance is not (or is no longer)" (1999:5). Use of 
the term mediatized thus indicates not only the deployment of electronic 
technology in the production of culture, but also the ways in which this very 
deployment brings that cultural production into a much wider network 
of dominant social and economic practices. Mediatization recognizes the 
deeper implications of technology's ubiquity in a way that a more neutral 
term like mediation cannot. My own use of the term mediatization is slightly 
but significantly reconfigured from that of Auslander, in that while I still rely 
on the term's ability to denote the profound effects of electronic media on 
the musical process, I also believe there are many forms of mediatized music 
that in fact challenge the "dominance of a single code" (Auslander 1999:5) 
informing Baudrillard's thinking and to a lesser extent that of Auslander 
himself. This is mainly because much mediatized music exists largely outside 
the economies of mass circulation so prominently explored in their usage, 
even though much of it is produced using popular contemporary forms of 
media technology. 
So much of our performance tradition has become mediatized that 
we must, as music scholars and practitioners, re-examine old distinctions 
between "live" and "not live." In this sense, then, I propose that we understand 
liveness not so much as a designation of"non-mediatization:'but rather as a 
designation of a trace of that which could be live, in the face of the threat of 
further or complete mediatization. As Simon Emmerson (2007:93) suggests, 
this trace of liveness may even be imagined. Arguably, the important thing 
is not whether sound was actually physically produced by a living being, but 
whether we perceive some sort of live presence in those sounds. Liveness is 
a perception, guided by the different ways it may be evoked inside cultural 
discourse and practice. 
In trying to understand our perceptions of liveness, we may be guided 
by Auslander's suggestion that the "exact meaning and cultural importance 
[ of liveness 1 are subject to change, especially in relation to technological 
development" (2005:8). Liveness exists as a fluid concept among different 
people and at different times, rather than as a concrete ontological category 
with well-defined essential characteristics. This very fluidity of the concept of 
liveness is, in part, what makes this issue so complex and worthy of further 
scrutiny. As Auslander argues, understandings of liveness may change as 
the technologies implicitly invoked by this concept change. Under such 
circumstances, the complexities of the current art music soundscape are 
no longer fully served by the simplistic understanding of live music as "not 
recorded." 
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In light of its fluidity, how should we define liveness, if not simply as an 
absence of obvious electronic mediation? I suggest above that liveness be 
understood as a designation of a trace of that which could be live, even within 
a mediatized musical context. In any given set of circumstances, this trace 
may be manifest in a number of ways. Elsewhere (Sanden 2008) I enumerate 
seven different potential categories of liveness, according to different ways 
that liveness has been discussed within the scholarly literature.2 In this essay, 
I will focus on what I call corporealliveness: liveness invoked by music's con-
nection to an acoustic sounding body, usually that of a human performer. Of 
all the accounts of musicalliveness within the literature, most rely at least in 
part (if not always explicitly) on definitions oflive performance as somehow 
corporeally based. This is primarily because it is difficult (if not impossible) 
to discuss concepts of live performance without eventual recourse to the 
body's role in-or conspicuous absence from-the musical contexts under 
discussion. In many cases, the dislocation of sound from its physical source 
(the musician originally producing that sound) causes observers to lament 
the loss of liveness from the recorded musical experience. 
A focus on musically performing bodies calls attention to another highly 
entrenched binarism within musical discourse: what Suzanne Cusick (1994) 
and others have identified as the "mind/body problem." This ideological 
binarism leads to an understanding of music as a collection of works, ideas, 
and interpretations (products of the mind), but not of actions, tactile sounds, 
and physical gestures (experiences of the body). The mind/body binarism 
in musical discourse is problematic in its denial of individual performing 
bodies, which results in the neglect of the social act of performance in much 
of our musical scholarship. This essay, then, will engage in what Elisabeth Le 
Guin (2006) calls a "carnal musicology" -a study of music as a physically 
enacted phenomenon-by discussing the mind/body binarism with respect 
to the pianist Glenn Gould. 
Gould has long been characterized, by himself and by others, as a thinking 
musician. The recording studio, he felt, offered him the greatest opportunity 
to construct performances that reflected his best ideas-interpretations 
formulated in his mind-about musical works, particularly because it 
afforded him the ability to reflect on his different recorded interpretations 
during the production process. Yet his recordings also present us with very 
tangible traces of corporeality, so much so that to listen to them is to hear 
a body performing, as long as we make room in the Gould mythology for a 
musician whose playing is as important as his thinking. Moreover, by address-
ing the corporealliveness so evident in Gould's recorded work, I present a 
reading of recordings-those so-called agents of disembodiment-in which 




music, first broadly, and then with respect to Gould. I will then address the 
place of recordings within a mind/body context, arguing that despite many 
assertions to the contrary, recording and disembodiment are not necessarily 
inextricably linked. Finally, I will discuss several of Gould's recordings, with 
an ear for traces of Gould's own performing body-his corporealliveness. 
Glenn Gould: Mind and Body 
The centrality of musical thinking (at the expense of musical physicality) is 
not unique to the case of Glenn Gould; rather, it is part of a long tradition. 
Within the history of Western art music, and particularly within scholarly 
writing associated with that history, music's most significant properties 
have long been linked to the realm of mental activity. People who adhere to 
this concept view music as the communication of ideas, abstract structures, 
complex patterns, etc., all of which are situated in musical works. Once 
composed, these works take on metaphysical properties, existing somehow 
in and of themselves, awaiting their representation in performance.3 Yet until 
recently, these performances were not often considered important on their 
own-as physical processes of sound creation and communication, carried 
out by musically laboring bodies. Rather, each performance was (and often 
still is) judged according to how successfully it communicated the ideas that 
constitute the composer's work. 
The primacy of mind in musical discourse has emerged in various guises, 
as has been demonstrated convincingly by several writers. In addition to 
Cusick's (1994) condemnation of the mind/body problem, and Le Guin's 
(2006) commendable example of carnal musicology, the issue is neatly ad-
dressed by Richard Leppert (1993 :96-1 0 1), who demonstrates that in many 
eighteenth-century treatises the "essential" qualities of music were held to 
exist in the mathematical relationships between the intervals of the Western 
tonal scale. This reduction of music to its mathematical properties presents 
an entirely knowable music, in line with the wider appeals to order and 
reason so prevalent during the European Enlightenment. The association 
of music and mind was also prominent within Romantic musical aesthetics, 
even if the nineteenth-century rhetoric surrounding this concept was more 
concerned with genius than with the rationality of the eighteenth century. 
Writing in 1813 about Beethoven's instrumental music, for example, E. T. A. 
Hoffmann repeatedly remarks on Beethoven's unrivalled genius, citing the 
"inner continuity" and "internal structure" of Beethoven's compositions as 
the true marks of their worthiness. Hoffmann emphasizes that the structural 
relationships found in Beethoven's compositions (for example, the unity of 
motivic materials across different movements of a work) are products of a 
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superior intellect and, furthermore, that "a deeper relationship which does 
not reveal itself in this way speaks at other times only from mind to mind, 
and it is precisely this relationship that ... imperiously proclaims the self-
possession of the master's genius" (1998:1195-6; myemphasis).4 
Reference to the nineteenth-century cult of genius, with Beethoven 
as its central figure, also raises the issue of the contemporaneous cult of 
the virtuoso, whose central figures were Franz Liszt and Nicolo Paganini. 
Although virtuosi's physical attributes were highly fetishized in the popular 
imagination (for instance, Liszt's hands were cast in molds several times 
during his life), I suggest that bodies remained "weaker" symbols of music's 
significance than brilliant minds. This can be explained best, perhaps, 
in light of Jacques Derrida's concept of phallogocentrism: the privileging 
of reason and mind, and the patriarchal hierarchy of that privileging, in 
Western epistemology.5 As Leppert (2007) demonstrates, music became 
gradually remasculinized throughout the nineteenth century, after centuries 
of association with feminine qualities. While Liszt did much in his own 
right to masculinize the piano, his gender image as a performer remained 
somewhat ambiguous, as did those of nineteenth-century performers in 
general. Furthermore, the individual responsible for masculinizing music 
more than any other at this time was not a virtuoso figure ( or at least not just 
a virtuoso figure) but Beethoven, the brooding and brainy musical genius 
par excellence (Leppert 2007:151-63).6 
These arguments depict a tradition in which the most important aspects 
of canonical Western art music (what is transmitted "from mind to mind") 
are found in its abstract compositional structure, created by relations between 
pitches (and to a lesser extent, rhythms). Within this scenario, anything not 
associated with these organizational structures-any noise, to use Jacques 
Attali's (1985) term-is an unwanted distraction, at best. In Attali's usage, 
noise does not refer just to the sonic phenomenon of "unmusical" sound, 
but also to whatever detracts from the organizational principles of music as 
they have historically been observed in Western musical practices.7 Gould 
comes quite honestly, then, to his own firm entrenchment within a mind-
centered concept of music, which is clear in his writings and interviews. 
He adheres to such a paradigm to the extent that he considers the noise of 
his body (both literally and in Attali's sense) to be quite incidental to his 
mental approach to music. 
Before delving too far into Gould's own remarks, it is worth considering 
the way he has usually been presented in the popular and scholarly media, 
for our perceptions of Gould the icon (informed largely by these media) 
most definitely influence how we listen to Gould the musician. Consider 
the following promotional lines, included by Columbia Masterworks on the 




When Mr. Gould made his recording debut, with the immensely difficult 
and demanding Goldberg Variations of Bach, his performance was so 
masterful that it elicited bravos from critics who found it difficult to believe 
that a young artist could offer such probing, sensitive interpretations. Mr. 
Gould has further demonstrated his rare understanding of Bach's music 
with recordings of the complete Partitas ... An avid reader, he prefers 
the works of Mann, Kafka, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche, and is 
himself a writer of several works on the masters of the Viennese school. 
(Gould 1963)8 
Not only are we told that Gould's greatest musical strengths lie in his "prob-
ing" intellect and in the depths of his "rare understanding:' but also that 
when he is not playing the piano, he further engages his mind by reading 
some of the most intellectually challenging literature in the Western canon 
and writing about the most cerebral music of the twentieth century.9 
A few years earlier, Ross Parmenter of the New York Times had presented 
a similar portrayal of Gould, following an engagement at the Stratford 
Summer Music Festival in which Gould spoke to the audience about the 
music he was performing. Parmenter attributed the success of the evening 
both to Gould's abilities on the piano and to his gifts as a "thinker": 
Mr. Gould is as gifted a musical thinker as he is a pianist ... Mr. Gould's 
comments [about the music of Berg, Schoenberg, and Krenek 1 gave the key 
to his own playing of the works. He understood their motivic coherence 
so well that each note seemed a vital part of a satisfying and emotionally 
expressive unit. (1956:26) 
Focus on the significance of Gould's intellectual abilities has reached beyond 
popular journalism. It has also become central to many of the lengthier 
studies of Gould's work, particularly those that deal more with his writings 
than with his playing. For instance, the first book-length study of Gould, 
Geoffrey Payzant's Glenn Gould: Music and Mind (1978), announces its bias 
in its title. John P. 1. Roberts's The Art of Glenn Gould: Reflections ofaMusical 
Genius (1999) expresses a similar bias in its title while also promoting a 
compatible image-one of Gould in contemplation-through its cover art. 
Even though Gould sits at the piano in this picture, he sits sideways with his 
left arm resting on the music stand and his gaze averted from the instru-
ment, giving the impression perhaps that the instrument itself is merely the 
necessary tool by which he imparts to his audience his deep understanding 
of the music. lO In other words, Gould playing is not nearly as important as 
Gould thinking. 11 
For all of this focus on Gould's mind, however, it is important to note 
that his performing body has seldom been ignored. Rather, Gould's physical 
actions have been cause for much concern and criticism; his body has thus 
been portrayed as an obstacle for his mind to overcome. 12 To be sure, Gould's 
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physical command of the piano was never questioned and regularly received 
acclaim from critics and other listeners. I suggest, however, that praise for 
his manual dexterity has often been overshadowed by praise for his mental 
dexterity and certainly by criticism of his other physical mannerisms. In this 
way Gould's body is depicted not so much as an essential part of his music 
making, but rather as a potential distraction from it. 
Gould's unusual stage demeanor during his performing years seems 
to have drawn the most negative press in this respect. Reviewers typically 
began by drawing attention to his idiosyncratic performance mannerisms 
(whether they enjoyed the program or not). Only after going through an 
entire litany of his physical quirks would they proceed to evaluate the recital. 
New York Times critic Harold C. Schonberg offers a particularly engaging 
description: 
At about 8:45 last night Glenn Gould, the cadaverous Canadian, 
shambled from the wings at Carnegie Hall, managed to get to the piano 
(which was mounted on small blocks), slumped back on a bench that 
seemed about three inches off the ground, put his feet on the pedals 
and also a throw rug underneath them, put a look of ecstatic suf-
fering on his face, and played much of his program very beautifully. 
He subsequently went through his familiar eccentricities, which included 
singing (he was not in especially good voice this time), conducting, and 
crossing his left leg over his right. (1959:14) 
Perhaps the most effective promotion of this dual image of Gould-one of 
formidable mind and imperfect body-came from Gould himself.13 Gould 
repeatedly stated in interviews and in his own writings that for him the 
most important aspect of any piece of music was its structure. He asserted, 
moreover, that his interpretation of such structures was primarily a mental 
process, quite distinct from the physical act of playing the piano. He often 
told his friend and colleague, John P. L. Roberts, that he could "practise in 
his head:' and that he "believed the piano had to be played with the mind" 
(Roberts 1999:26). Corporeal activity, then, become secondary to cerebral 
activity. This is not to say that Gould completely ignored the tactile aspects 
of playing the piano, or that he never spoke of them. On the contrary, his 
own views on the performance of the piano itself were based far more on 
how the instrument felt under his fingers than on the sounds he could get 
from it (Bazzana 2003:197-98). He often stated that his own distinctive ap-
proach to playing the piano grew out of the tactile way in which he learned 
to play the organ. He explains that when playing the organ, the whole effect 
of clarity ofline, of detached sound, has got to be achieved by a lifting of the 
finger after the note has been struck and not an attack on the note before 




This was the method of playing which of course I learned on the organ 
and which I simply transferred to the piano, a method which involved 
minimal movement of the fingers, really, and which-I'm sorry to reduce 
this to something so physical, but this is really what it was-and a method 
which began by starting at the key rather than above it, and [in] which no 
amount of excessive force could be brought to bear on the piano. (Gould 
and Rich 1999:139; my emphasis) 
Gould reveals two crucial points here. First, even his physical approach to the 
instrument is only as "physical" as absolutely necessary, in that it involves as 
little movement as possible. In addition to the "minimal movement of the 
fingers," he avoids any "excessive force" in his playing. 14 Second, and I think 
more significantly, Gould feels the need to apologize for speaking about his 
playing in such blatantly physical terms. He does modify this account some-
what in other interviews, making clear that the physical demands of playing 
the piano are worked out in the mind long before they are ever acted out at 
the instrument. In one instance, he speaks of "practicing" mentally while 
away from the piano for long periods of time, and states that "one carries 
the fingerings in one's head at all times" (Gould and Aikin 1999:269-70). 
Gould was able to further reconcile his tactile approach to the instru-
ment with his mind-centered concept of music because he felt that since 
the real business of music making went on in the mind, it was not tied to 
performance on any particular instrument. Put another way, physicality 
was important to Gould only insofar as it allowed him to realize a piece 
on the piano, which was secondary to understanding the piece in its own 
abstract and disembodied state. Gould's praise of pianist Sviatoslav Richter 
resonates very strongly with the image he projected of himself. As such, it 
helps to further clarify his views on the physical mechanics of making music. 
He argues that musicians can be divided into two categories: "those who 
seek to exploit the instruments they use, and those who do not:' Richter, he 
believes, belongs to the second category, which 
includes musicians who try to bypass the whole question of the 
performing mechanism, to create the illusion, at any rate, of a direct 
[mental] link between themselves and a particular musical score and 
who, therefore, help the listener to achieve a sense of involvement, 
not with the performance per se, but, rather, with the music itself ... 
[It] is possible ... to achieve such a perfect liaison with the instrument that 
the mechanical process involved becomes all but invisible-totally at the 
service of the musical structure-and that the performer, and consequently 
the listener, is then able to ignore all superficial questions of virtuosity or 
instrumental display and concentrate instead on the spiritual qualities 
inherent in the music itself. (Gould 1999b:52-53) 
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In a similar vein, Gould's comments about the tactile aspects of any particular 
piece were often quickly followed by a comment about the more important 
issue of analysis. Gould's description of Jacques Hetu's Variations for piano 
provides an example: 
Hetu's flair for the instrument is unmistakable. Everything works and 
sounds and lies rewardingly beneath the fingers. Yet, the impressive thing 
about these Variations is that despite their unabashedly theatrical inclina-
tion, they are held together by a sure sense of the purely musical values 
inherent in their material. (Gould 1967) 
Gould then explains that the material in question is a twelve-tone row and 
goes on to discuss the tonal qualities inherent in this row. To Gould, then, 
"purely musical values" are to be found in the analysis of a piece; not in the 
physical act of playing it. 
Gould's views on the importance of analytical thought in music must 
also be understood in relation to his thoughts about the limitations and 
frailty of his own body. As a particular extension of his admitted hypochon-
dria' Gould lived in constant fear oflosing all control of his hands. IS He made 
headlines in 1960 when he sued the Steinway and Sons piano company for 
an incident involving one of their technicians, who purportedly greeted 
Gould with a "thump" on the back, causing injury to Gould's left shoulder 
and hand. 16 CBS itself was quite eager to share with Gould's listeners his 
constant concerns about blood circulation in his forearms and hands, in a 
press release issued with Gould's first Goldberg Variations recording (1956; 
reprinted in Page 2002). 
Regarding his physical eccentricities in performance, Gould also con-
sidered them necessary only to the point that they helped him achieve his 
ideal performance. He once told an interviewer that when it first came to 
his attention in 1956 that his singing and conducting were distracting to 
his audiences, he became very self-conscious because he had never before 
given any thought to his physical appearance during performance. "The 
whole secret of what I had been doing:' he explained, "was to concentrate 
exclusively on realizing a [mental] conception of the music, regardless of 
how it was physically achieved" (Gould and Asbell 1999:186). 
Gould establishes a clear hierarchy, then, regarding his thoughts about 
music and his subsequent bodily efforts to represent those thoughts in 
sound. Clearly, to Gould, a musician's physical actions are only important 
insofar as they serve his or her mental conception of how a particular work 
should sound. Gould's views are by no means unique or radical, as they 
simply reflect the mind"centered concept prevalent for centuries within 




he explains this hierarchy. He is also notable, paradoxically, for how much 
of an inadvertent physical response he clearly had to music despite his own 
devaluation of music's existence in the physical realm. Gould's willing and 
almost perverse refusal to acknowledge the significance of his body in his 
own musical practice, in spite of the overt physicality of his playing, further 
parallels the immense lack of attention paid to corporeal meaning in so 
much Western musical thought. 
Disembodied Music or Corporeal Liveness? Performances on 
Record 
If Gould was uninterested in music's corporeal qualities, audio recording 
would seem to be the perfect medium through which he could exercise his 
mind -centered approach to performance. While Gould never explicitly stated 
as much, many others have argued that recorded sound is essentially disem-
bodied sound. John Corbett's description of an "audio-visual disjunction" 
(1990:84) in recorded music provides a useful introduction to this discussion. 
For Corbett, popular music consumers' various attempts to reconstitute a 
visual element in their encounters with recordings (through music videos, 
album cover art, and audio imagingl7 ) are a result of the desire to "negotiate 
the menacing void" left by the removal of the body from recorded musical 
experiences (1990:85). In popular music, according to Corbett, this body 
is removed not only visually, but also aurally by echo, compression,18 and 
other recording studio techniques. Ultimately for Corbett, these aural traces 
also become visual: 
The sound of fingers, lips, legs, and nose are all traces of the performer, 
the absent performer, and they foreground the visual. Echo, by doubling 
the sound upon itself, and compression, by doing away with unseemly 
transients, wrench the sound of music from the body of the performer and 
erase its trace ... [Recordings] appeal to a fantasy of absolutely independent 
music, where concerns of the image never enter the picture. Lullaby, close 
your eyes, and good night. (1990:92) 
This "fantasy of absolutely independent music" can be linked to the general 
logo centrism that N. Katherine Hayles argues is indicative of the digital era. 
She traces this logo centrism back through Western thought to the liberal 
humanist subject of the late seventeenth century.19 Hayles argues that to 
many modern thinkers, the universe is composed essentially of information, 
which thus encourages a fantasy comparable to that identified by Corbett: 
[TJhat because we are essentially information, we can do away with the 
body. Central to this argument is a conceptualization that sees information 
and materiality as distinct entities. This separation allows the construction 
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of a hierarchy in which information is given the dominant position and 
materiality runs a distant second. As though we had learned nothing from 
Derrida ... embodiment continues to be discussed as if it were a supple-
ment to be purged from the dominant term of information, an accident 
of evolution we are now in a position to correct. (Hayles 1999:12) 
The parallels between Hayles's examples and those from within Western 
art music (Gould, Beethoven, etc.) are evident. Yet, for many musicologists 
concerned with ·reconstituting the value of corporeality in accounts of 
Western music, their arguments about disembodied sound, like Corbett's, 
nonetheless revolve around a lack of a certain kind of visual information in a 
given musical experience. In these cases, perception of performing bodies is 
equated with seeing those bodies (or at least with constructing mental images 
of those bodies). 20 For some writers, the danger of a mind -centered musical 
perspective coupled with recording is that these recordings thus become an 
easy method by which listeners "can have the pleasure of the sound without 
the troubling reminder of the bodies producing it" (McClary 1991:136). 
While productive, such accounts of recordings as agents of disem-
bodiment promote an overriding technophobia that ignores the very real 
potential for sound technology to further increase a listener's engagement 
with corporeality in mediatized music. When we consider the historic 
development of sound recording and reproduction technologies, we realize 
that these technologies were modeled after our own bodies' methods of 
hearing sound-after the physiology of the human ear (indeed some early 
sound technologies created by both Clarence Blake and Alexander Graham 
Bell involved the use of real, dissected, human ears). As Jonathan Sterne 
argues, "the body is the first communication technology, and ... technolo-
gies oflistening ... emerge out of techniques oflistening" (2003:92). Many 
such techniques were developed inside the human body (Sterne calls them 
"techniques of the body") long before technologies outside of the human 
body were ever conceived of. To assume that sound technologies interrupt the 
corporeal significance of sounds simply because they remove these sounds 
from their visual sources is thus to ignore corporeally sensitive techniques 
of listening that have little if anything to do with sight. 
To help rectify this omission, I turn to other writers who have suggested 
how we might begin to recognize and appreciate performing bodies, even 
when we lack any visual clues about them. Phenomenologists have long 
argued that everything we perceive is rooted in a sense of embodiment, since 
even our minds are physically situated in the world. This idea has also been 
taken up by music cognition scholars. Marc Leman, for instance, argues 
that "the subjective world of mental representations is not an autonomous 




ment" (2008:13).21 Several writers have followed this line of argument to 
suggest that, in perceiving music, listeners relate the sounds they hear to 
their own embodied understandings of their environment. Variations on 
this argument bear several different labels, including "kinematic empathy" 
(Todd 1995), "bodily hearing" (Mead 1999), "the mimetic hypothesis" 
(Cox 2001), and "corporeal signification" (Leman 2008:17-19),22 Whatever 
the label, these concepts all describe a listener making sense of music not 
abstractly, but through corporeal involvement. The body acts as a mediator 
between physical sound and mental cognition (Leman 2008). 
In this way, for instance, a regular rhythmic pulse within a given piece 
of music may engage a listener's experiences of regular rhythms within her 
own body, such as the beating of her heart, or her experiences of walking 
and running. Moreover, music perception also relies on a listener's embodied 
understanding of sound production itself. In other words, the recognition 
that someone struck a drum to produce a particular sound may engage a 
listener's own understanding of how it feels to make that physical gesture. 
Arnie Cox (2001) is particularly helpful in explaining this perceptual 
phenomenon, because he focuses on the sound-producing body. In his 
account of a "mimetic hypothesis," Cox presents the dual assertion that '(1) 
we understand sounds in comparison to sounds we have made ourselves, 
and that 2) this process of comparison involves tacit imitation, or mimetic 
participation, which in turn draws on the prior embodied experience of 
sound production" (2001: 195).23 
Such theories of corporeal listening are based on the sounds of bodies 
and on physical responses to sounds, rather than on the act of viewing 
bodies. As such, they suggest that corporealliveness-the audible trace of 
bodies performing-may be evident in musical recordings, even if many 
choose not to hear it. Furthermore, corporeal perceptions of liveness carry 
a significance in recorded music that accounts of recordings as disembodied 
music deny. As Cox argues, "music invites us to participate-both in our 
imagination, which is automatically informed by embodied experience via 
tacit mimetic participation, and overtly in the form of such things as toe-
tapping, swaying, dancing, and singing along. The ways in which we respond 
to the invitation to participate ... are part of how we define ourselves and 
society" (Cox 2001:206-7). An account of corporealliveness in recordings, 
in other words, recognizes recorded music as a form of communication 
in which the performer (and not just the composer's work) holds great 
significance, even if this communication is made indirect by the mediation 
of technology. 
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Gould's Body on Record: The Mediatization of Gould's 
Performances 
Before discussing Gould's recordings directly, I will address his statements 
about the recorded medium, at least as they relate to this notion of communi-
cation I have just described. For Gould, music was not about communication 
between performer and audience. After retiring from the concert stage in 
1964, he was asked by interviewers if he missed the direct connection so 
many performers claim to share with their audiences. 24 Gould responded 
that he never felt such a connection when he was concertizing, so he certainly 
did not miss it now that his performances were confined to recording and 
broadcast studios. Rather, he viewed the microphone as a "friend," and if 
anything, felt more communion with it than with any potential audience 
(Gould and TovellI999:80). 
Gould was not entirely against the idea of musical communication, 
but he viewed it as a line of communication that ideally did not involve the 
performer. To Gould, recordings offered a connection with a much broader 
audience, but one that was, paradoxically, more intimate than that offered in 
a live performance setting. His perspective relies once again on understand-
ing the musical work as occupying the place of primary importance. This 
intimate connection does not take place between performer and listener, but 
rather between listener and work, and through the work, between listener 
and composer. Gould felt that one of the strengths of electronic sound 
technology lay in its ability to present for composers a permanent record of 
their own interpretations (in the form of dectroacoustic works or their own 
performances) so that they would not have to rely on other performers to 
get it right. Moreover, Gould argued, listeners will connect more intimately 
with that work since they "will be forced to come to decisions about the 
work of art because of the reaction which they themselves receive from it, 
and for no other reasons" (Gould 1999a:219). Because they are listening 
privately, in other words, these listeners will generate a response to and an 
interpretation of the work completely by their own means, and will not be 
distracted by the responses of their neighbors in a concert hall or by the 
presence of the performer on stage. For Gould, music was an "essentially 
private act" between composer and listener (Gould 1992: 180) rather than an 
opportunity for meaningful communication between performer and listener, 
as my own approach to liveness (here and in Sanden 2008) suggests. 
Nonetheless, and with all apologies to Glenn Gould, I maintain that his 
recordings do convey performative significance, not just through his brilliant 
interpretations of musical works, but also through the corporealliveness 




one can constantly hear not just abstract musical structures (disembodied 
notes), but also many of the incidental sounds-the noise-involved in 
Gould's act of sounding out those structures on the piano and with his 
voice. Gould's recordings provide an excellent opportunity to perceive this 
corporealliveness in part due to the close microphone pick-up that he and his 
recording studio collaborators often employed. Basic microphone technique 
dictates that the further a microphone is placed from its intended source of 
sound, the more the reverberant qualities of the recording space will alter 
that sound. In Gould's case, a close microphone perspective avoided a great 
deal of room reverberation, resulting in very clear recordings of the sounds 
emanating directly from the piano and from its immediate vicinity; hence 
the clarity of Gould's bodily sounds, discussed below.25 
Gould's intention was not, however, to provide a "close-up" audio 
perspective on his body making music. On the contrary, and in line with 
his mind-centered concept of musical communication, Gould deployed 
this particular use of recording technology in an effort to make the musical 
structure more apparent to his listeners. He felt that the more customary 
recording acoustic usually employed for recordings of classical music (at 
least in his time), which captured the natural resonances of the performance/ 
recording space, provided an acoustic "halo" around the sound in an effort 
to make it sound more like a live event.26 For Gould, the goal was rather to 
achieve a certain analytical quality in the sound: one that would allow the 
listener to hear each individual note as clearly as possible. The added effect of 
this close-microphone set-up, however, is that we can also hear, very clearly, 
the noise of Gould's body playing his piano. In addition to his singing, we 
can hear his physical interaction with his instrument; moreover, we hear the 
tactility of that instrument: the creaking of his chair as he sways, the percus-
sive nature of hammers hitting strings, the re-dampening of strings as he lifts 
his foot off the sustain pedal, and the very precise nuances of articulation 
that are lost in recordings with a more typically reverberant sound. The rest 
of this essay will address specific examples in Gould's recorded output in 
which these traces of corporeality are most easily perceived. The liveness of 
Gould's sounding body in these recordings, audible because ofmediatization, 
draws attention to the significance of Gould's performances and not merely 
that of his interpretations. 
Gould's Voice 
The most obvious evidence of Gould's own performing body in his record-
ings is his almost constant singing. Gould once told an interviewer that his 
singing was a reflection of how he thought his phrases should sound, because 
his fingers never quite got it exactly right (Gould and McClure 1968). At the 
same time he felt, like many of his critics, that the singing was a dreadful 
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distraction from "the music" and wished he could stop doing it without 
feeling as though it made his playing worseY Despite attempts to shield this 
sound from the microphones, his recording engineers were unable to avoid 
picking it up; it ranges in clarity and loudness from one recording to another. 
Most of the time, Gould clearly reproduces one of the piano's melodic lines 
with his singing, often with a character that matches what he is conveying 
in his playing. The full significance of the liveness inherent in Gould's voice 
stems largely from the variety in his singing as he demonstrates vocally the 
nuances of phrasing, dynamics, and articulation to which he aspires in his 
playing. For it is through the identification of Gould's various vocal stylings 
that we can also identify a voice emanating from a particular body, rather 
than just a disembodied voice in the background of a piano recording. I 
will discuss several moments in Gould's two recordings of Bach's Goldberg 
Variations (1956; 1982) when the singing is most pronounced, demonstrating 
how Gould's performing body is represented in his vocalizations. 
I have chosen to focus mainly on Gould's Goldberg Variations recordings 
for several reasons. First, they are perhaps the most prominent recordings of 
Gould's entire discography. As such, they are highly available and potentially 
well-known to many readers. Second, Gould's singing is more easily heard 
here, particularly on the remastered version from which I am working (Gould 
2002), than on any other Gould album I have been able to consult.28 Third, 
the composition itself ranges widely in character from one variation to the 
next, prompting a wide variety of vocal responses from Gould in a rather 
condensed format. Other recordings by Gould, on the other hand, may 
also offer clear and engaging singing, but often the character of this singing 
remains unchanged throughout an entire piece (or at least throughout a 
movement). 
Variation 25 from Gould's 1982 recording demonstrates clearly his 
tendency simply to hum along with individual voices within the piece's 
overall texture. The variation, marked Adagio, is lyrically written. In Gould's 
rendition, it unfolds slowly and clearly. While the variation progresses 
primarily as a solo treble line accompanied by simple pulses in the left hand 
voices, Bach does engage in a bit of counterpoint between the treble voice 
in the right hand and the two voices in the left hand. During the variation, 
Gould alternates between vocally mimicking the treble voice and one of the 
accompanying lower voices. Due to the transparent texture of the movement 
(particularly as realized in Gould's performance), we now hear four clear 
voices: three from the piano and one from Gould's throat, which variously 
mimics each of the other three. Most of the time in this variation, Gould 
projects a basic hum: we hear either a closed "m" sound or a dark long "e" 
vowel, and very little articulation in the way of hard consonants. This is 




Example 1: J.S. Bach, The Goldberg Variations, Variation 25, mm. 1--4, with vocal syllables 




mm dum dmdmdmdllm_dadmdmdmm' Ii mm_ d~ da dadm.Jum mm_ 
mill mm mi • ll_ mm_ 
i 
Perhaps the most significant indicators of Gould's corporeality in this 
variation, however, happen in the moments when Gould is not humming. 
They occur during the brief moments between his voiced hums when he 
breathes. The clarity of the recording is such that nearly every time Gould 
stops for breath, we can hear him inhale.29 Example 1 shows a transcrip-
tion of Gould's vocalizations (along with Bach's notated score) for the first 
four measures of this variation, including the moments where he breathes 
(indicated with asterisks). 
At this moment, a comparison with Gould's first Goldberg Variations 
(1956) is intriguing. At two different instances in Variation 15 of that record-
ing, Gould audibly exhales through pursed lips, rather than singing as he 
usually does. In addition to the whistling air, beginning at 0:05 (m. 2, beat 
2),30 we quite clearly hear Gould articulate these breaths with a "t" sound 
to match the articulation of first the middle and then the upper voice in 
the piano. (This variation, "Canone all Quinta in moto contrario;' is written 
as a canon in three voices.) Gould similarly exhales "musically" at the start 
of the variation's second half, beginning at 1:04 (m. 17). In both of these 
instances, we hear Gould expel and shape this air with his lips, teeth, and 
tongue. Suddenly the voice we hear on these recordings is not just an ethereal 
humming sound, but it has a source: a living, breathing body. 
Paul Sanden 
Example 2: J.S. Bach, The Goldberg Variations, Variation 2, mm. 1-8, with vocal syllables 




Andantino, dolce (indctenninate pitch) 
dlll11dumd~a digadllm dumdumdumbadumdullldum 
[inaudiblel 
dee dum da dum 1<1 ti - um tum ba dum mm mm 
Breathing aside, the singing we hear in both of these variations is 
rather uneventful compared to some of Gould's recorded vocalizations. For 
instance, on his 1982 recording of Variation 2, Gould offers a rich variety 
of vocal sounds in a very short time (the variation runs only forty-seven 
seconds in this recording). Like Variation 25, Bach writes this variation in 
three distinct voices. Gould begins his rendition by vocally reproducing the 
most rhythmically active voice (sometimes in harmony), thus alternating 
between the top two. Gould's performance of this variation on the piano 
demonstrates a variety of articulations, moving as it does quite freely 
between legato and staccato playing and achieving various note lengths in 
the space between those two extremes. His singing, however, demonstrates 
even more variety through the different syllables he employs. Gould can 
clearly be heard singing the syllables, "da;"'dee;"'dum;"'badum;' "ta;' "tum;' 
"ti;' "tu;' and even "diga-diga-dum;' among others (see example 2). The 
syllables themselves are not particularly significant, so much as the extent 
to which they further engage Gould's vocal apparatus to give us a sense of 
what Roland Barthes calls the "grain of the voice": the "tongue, the glottis, 
the teeth, the mucous membranes, the nose" (Barthes 1977:183). In other 
words, they reveal the body. At several moments, Gould also clearly increases 
the intensity of his voice to match his pianistic phrasing. These little vocal 
swells, brought on by increased airflow and diaphragm support, provide 
further evidence of Gould's vocal apparatus at workY We hear the tactility 





Vocal sounds emanate from inside a performer's body, providing us with 
evidence of that performer's interior movements. In addition to the sounds 
of the piano itself (addressed below), some of Gould's recordings offer even 
further evidence of his external movements as he plays the piano. On the 
sleeve of Gould's Beethoven Piano Sonatas, Opus 10 Complete (1965), his 
producer Thomas Frost offers the following explanation and apology: 
For some years now, [Gould 1 has been merrily fugueing his way through 
the keyboard works of Bach, Beethoven and Schoenberg to the accompani-
ment of the strange creakings and groanings of an old, beloved friend-his 
piano stool. This object of endearment, decrepit and moth-eaten as it 
is (having reached retirement age long ago), apparently has learned to 
swing and sway so perfectly with Glenn Gould's body motions that he 
has stubbornly refused to part with it in spite of all counsel and advice ... 
[We 1 hope that you, the consumer, will refuse to be discomforted by some 
audible creaks that are insignificant in light of the great music-making on 
this disc. (Gould 1965) 
Indeed, throughout this recording, Gould's chair creaks audibly in appar-
ent sympathy with his body's movements as he plays; I would argue that 
these creaks are a delightful and essential part of the "great music-making 
on this disc," rather than a distraction from it. As the second movement of 
Beethoven's Sonata No.5 in C Minor, op. 10, no. 1 begins, for instance, we 
hear not only Beethoven's embellished chorale-like opening and Gould's 
usual accompanimental singing, but also the gentle creaks of Gould's chair 
as he moves through this opening passage. Throughout the movement the 
chair's sounds seem to indicate relatively little extraneous body movement 
on Gould's part: just the occasional shift in weight, perhaps as he depresses 
or releases a pedal or reaches to a different part of the keyboard. At times 
(for exampk, 2:1S/mm. 22-23) the chair's noises occur during moments 
of relaxed energy in the piece, seemingly indicating a body moving not in 
sympathy with the movement of the musical line itself, or with the move-
ment of Gould's arms as made necessary by that musicalline.32 At others, 
however, it seems apparent that Gould's own range of motion increases 
with an increased intensity and forward motion in the piece. One of these 
sequences begins at 2:53 (m. 51, beat 2) and continues with added chair noise 
until a moment of peak musical energy is reached (3:1S/m. 60), at which 
point the chair noises subside along with the energy projected in Gould's 
playing. A similar demonstration of Gould's bodily movement is represented 
by increased chair noise beginning around 5:22 (m. 9S), as Gould moves 
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through a final surge of energy indicated in the score by a rising contour 
and a crescendo (both typically interpreted in Western musical practice as 
markers of increased energy). His chair remains almost entirely silent after 
5:46 (m. 106), as the forward momentum of the piece slows and finally 
comes to a halt. 
Gould's Piano 
Finally, the body of the piano itself is also quite audible in many of Gould's 
recordings to an extent uncommon in piano recordings, particularly those 
made by Gould's contemporaries. Here I speak of the noise of the piano 
as it is played: not the pitches produced by the depression of keys and the 
relatively undifferentiated timbre of the piano across its range, but rather 
the sounds of the piano's mechanical parts coming in contact with one 
another. These sounds seem to me excellent indicators of the kinetic energy 
involved in playing the piano: a finger depresses a key, for instance, and a 
pitch only results once that energy has been transferred into the throwing 
of a hammer against a string. A piano's noises, then, represent actions taken 
by the pianist, reminding us of the physical relationship enjoyed between 
the pianist's body and that of his or her piano. Contrary to Gould's praise 
of Richter's ability to make the piano's mechanism invisible/inaudible, I 
find these noises significant and indicative of the vital corporeality of piano 
performance. Such recognition of the physical relationship established be-
tween Gould's body and that of his piano also emphasizes a sort of corporeal 
co-dependence between musician and instrument. In other words, without 
one another, both of these bodies remain mute. Music sounds only when 
they come together in performance. 
For my final corporeal hearing, then, I turn to the fifth movement, 
"Sarabande;' in Gould's 1963 recording of Bach's Partita No.4 in D Major. 
While we obviously hear the evidence of Gould's fingers in motion, this 
recording also captures evidence of his feet in motion. The most obvious 
example of Gould's pedaling is demonstrated by the simple "clunking" noise 
that occurs when Gould releases his pedal, captured clearly at the end of 
both the first A section and the A' section (l:04/m. 12 and 4:44/m. 38; the 
movement's form can be described as A-B-A', with Gould observing the 
repeat of the first A section). 
I also detect in the Sarabande a very beautiful recurring instance of 
corporealliveness created by a particular combination of Gould's fingering 
and pedaling. The second measure of each section in the movement ends 
with a half note in the treble voice, held over a triad that has been built 




Example 3a: J.S. Bach, Partita No.4 in D Major, Sarabande, mm. 2-3, h. 1. 
2 
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r 
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note, an a",33 doubles the third in a diminished iii chord that moves to the 
sub dominant in the next measure (see example 3a). In the B section, the 
half note, an e", functions as the seventh degree in a major-minor seventh 
chord leading to a G-major chord, which is spelled out in the first beat of 
the next measure (see example 3b). Each time this moment occurs in his 
performance (O:OS/m. 2, l:lllm. 2, 2:1S/m.14, 3:4S/m. 30), Gould holds the 
sustain pedal down until he has clearly voiced each note in the measure. At 
some point before he releases the sustain pedal, he also releases both of the 
keys he has been depressing with his left hand. He then releases the sustain 
pedal so that we only hear the top two notes, emphasizing the inverted minor 
third between c" and a" in the A and A' sections, and the minor seventh 
b'etween fi' and e" in the B section. Finally, he releases the lower note in his 
right hand so that we hear the top note ringing on its own before he moves 
on to the next measure. 
The first three times Gould performs this little act of manual and pedal 
precision in the Sarabande (that is, in both iterations of the A section and in 
the B section), we hear it exactly as I imagine he intended, and the harmonic 
importance of those particular notes is emphasized according to Gould's 
interpretation. When this moment occurs in the A' section, however, another 
acoustic reminder of the physical contact between performer and instrument 
sounds. In this instance (3:SlIm. 30), Gould releases the pedal and the c" key 
in such a way that the felt intended to dampen the strings corresponding to 
that key actually causes a momentary "shimmer" on that note. Such an effect 
is created when felts are held, by way of a partially depressed sustain pedal, 
just slightly off the strings-far enough away that the strings are afforded 
more room to vibrate, but still close enough to the strings to restrict that 
vibration somewhat. Thus, before our attention is drawn to the sustained 
a" at the end of this measure, it is first drawn to the c" beneath it, which 
Gould inadvertently emphasizes when he releases the sustain pedal. Such an 
audible effect, inadvertent or not, is a clear reminder of the physical process 
of playing the piano and thus another strong indicator of the significance 
of corporeality on this particular recording. 
Paul Sanden 
Example 3b: J.S. Bach, Partita No.4 in D Major, Sarabande, mm. 14-15, b. 1. 
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Conclusion 
I have presented in this article corporeal hearings of several of Gould's 
recordings. I offer these interpretations with particular awareness of how 
they relate to an abiding mind/body binarism in discussions of Western 
music and in Western epistemology more generally. Particularly in light of 
Gould's well-established mind-centered persona (promoted both by Gould's 
commentators and through his own efforts) these hearings suggest that even 
the most "cerebral" of musicians can be heard corporeally. In Gould's case, 
his particular engagement with recording technology affords us greater access 
to the qualities of corporealliveness apparent in his performances, despite 
his own views on the role of performing bodies in musical practice. 
My discussion of Gould's recordings leads me to confront accounts of 
recordings that present them as representations of disembodied music. While 
many concerns about the alienating potential of technology in music are well 
placed, such accounts often ignore the very real potential in mediatized music 
for increased communication of corporeal-and thus human-significance. 
Relationships between liveness and mediatization must be reconsidered so 
that, where appropriate, mediatization may be construed as a productive 
way to project new and necessary understandings of musical meaning. A 
static livelrecorded binarism, in light of such arguments, no longer seems 
appropriate. By hearing Glenn Gould's body in his recordings, we hear his 
liveness. Not only can we then rethink our common conceptions of Gould's 
musicianship, but also our common conceptions of recorded music. An 
awareness of liveness reminds us of the sociality of music by emphasizing 
its performance, even when conventional indicators of performance become 
reconfigured by the very acts of mediatization I emphasize here. In an era 
of potentially de-socializing technological practices (internet shopping, 
automated bank tellers, anonymous on-line communications, etc.), such a 





I am most grateful for the support and input of a number of people throughout the process 
of writing this article, chief among them: Jonathan Burston, Nicholas Cook, Omar Daniel, 
Carolyn Herrington, Sandra Mangsen, Richard Parks, and Rick Semmens. 
1. Among the many important accounts of liveness, see Feuer (1983) for an account of tele-
visualliveness, Gracyck (1996) and Auslander (1999) for discussions ofliveness in rock music, 
and Emmerson (2007) for an extensive treatise on liveness in electroacoustic music. 
2. These categories are: temporal liveness, spatial liveness, liveness of fidelity, liveness of 
spontaneity, corporealliveness, interactive liveness, and virtualliveness. 
3. As Lydia Goehr (1992) suggests, since ca. 1800 works of Western art music have generally 
been considered to be unique (and entirely reified) objects representative of a specialized 
genius labour (composition). The usual existence of these works in written scores reiterates 
this reification. 
4. Hoffmann's views are particularly significant to my account of this historically consistent 
perspective on music and mind, due to the extent to which his writings served as models 
for a developing style of Germanic music criticism in the nineteenth century (see Strunk's 
introduction to Hoffmann [1998:1193)). Twentieth-century musicology, and evidently 
Gould's own approach to the evaluation of music, grew out of this very tradition. 
5. For a further discussion of phallogocentrism, see especially Derrida (1979). 
6. Other significant answers to the troubling neglect of musical embodiment in Western 
musical discourse include David Lidov's "Mind and Body in Music" (1987); George Fisher 
and Judy Lochhead's "Analyzing from the Body" (2002; see below, n. 22); Michelle Duncan's 
"The Operatic Scandal of the Singing Body: Voice, Presence, Performativity" (2004); and 
Tracy McMullen's "Corpo-Realities: Keepin' It Real in 'Music and Embodiment' Scholarship" 
(2006; see below, n. 20). 
7. Attali links this concept further to relationships of power as they are carried out in the 
social practice of music, particularly focusing on the increasing commodification of music 
through history. While I will not engage with Attali's economic discussions, I believe that 
his poetic use of the word noise (bruit, in the original French) fits well in the context of a 
mind/body discussion of musical value. 
8. Columbia Masterworks was the "classical" division of the Columbia record label. This 
division became CBS Masterworks in 1980; following the 1987 purchase of CBS by Sony, the 
classical division was renamed Sony Classical in 1990. Current releases of Gould's record-
ings are thus issued and owned by Sony Classical. See ''A Brief History of the Sony Classical 
Label;' Sony Classical, http://www.sonyclassical.com/about/history.html (accessed May 25, 
2008) for further details. 
9. The reference here is to the so-called Second Viennese School, usually considered to com-
prise Arnold Schoenberg and his pupils, Anton Webern and Alban Berg. Gould was about 
to publish a short monograph about Schoenberg (Gould 1964) and had also given several 
talks on the topic of serial music. 
10. Indeed, as I will discuss below, this is how Gould often described his relationship with 
the piano and with the music he played. 
11. My own previous work on Gould is guilty of the same bias toward his philosophies and 
ideas, at the expense of any serious discussion of the physical act of playing. See Sanden 
(2003a, 2003b, 2005). As I suggest below, while it is important to address the very real con-
nection between mind and body in music, the prevailing paradigm heavily favors the mind 
at great detriment to bodies. This essay attempts to correct the balance, not only in my own 
work, but in Gould scholarship in general. 
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12. Late in his career, Gould struggled to maintain complete control over his left hand. 
Roberts's comments on this struggle present a clear image of a mind under attack by a body: 
"Gould's effort to control every function of his performing mechanism made superhuman 
demands on his mind and it seems that, at times, when he relaxed these demands and con-
centrated on the music, he achieved better results" (Roberts 1999:25). 
13. Gould worked very hard to promote a particular image of himself. My own impression 
is that at least some of his mannerisms and pronouncements were as much adopted for the 
sake of this image as they were reflections of his true thoughts and feelings. Nevertheless, the 
persona Gould crafted for himself was accepted by a vast public. As I am concerned here with 
the Gould discourse more than with the conditions of Gould's private reality (whatever they 
may have been), I will relate his professed beliefs without questioning their veracity. 
14. Elsewhere (Gould and Braithwaite 1999:41), Gould explains that one of the reasons he 
avoids so much Romantic piano repertoire is that it requires more arm strength in fortissimo 
passages than he can generate given his low seating position. 
15. As discussed above (n. 12), Roberts relates that in 1977, Gould actually did suffer from a 
loss of manual control. He explained to Roberts that "his hands were 'out of sync' with his 
mind" (Roberts 1999:24). 
16. See Bazzana (2003: 194-97) for further discussion. During the ensuing legal discussions, 
Gould argued that he was of a particularly frail disposition and that he had previously 
warned the people at Steinway that they should accordingly avoid unnecessary physical 
contact with him. 
17. Audio imaging is the term usually applied to the practice of creating a spatially visualiz-
able sound field on a recording, through stereo placement, careful use of reverberation (to 
create the impression of distance), and other techniques. 
18. Compression is a sound filtering technique that reduces the overall dynamic range of a 
sound signal, essentially boosting the average dynamic level of the entire signal while lower-
ing that of the stronger parts of the signal. By flattening the signal in this way, this technique 
obscures many of the corporeally identifying noises that are easier to hear with a more highly 
differentiated dynamic spectrum. 
19. Derrida's OfGrammatology (1976) is perhaps the most significanttand foundational text 
in which the tenets of logocentrism are explained. 
20. For instance, see Tracy McMullen's discussion of "Recorded versus Embodied Perform-
ance" (2006:61-64), in which she locates the central significance of "embodied performance" 
in that performing body's ability to be seen. 
21. In this, parallels with phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty's foundational arguments 
are evident. For instance, Merleau-Pontywrote: "The perceiving subject is not [an] absolute 
thinker; rather, it functions according to a natal pact between our body and the world, between 
ourselves and our body" (1964:6). More recently, neuroscientists have provided empirical 
evidence to support the assertion thllt "a disembodied mind as such does not exist" (Leman 
2008:13). See, for example, Damasio (2000) and Jeannerod (2002). 
22. See also Fisher and Lochhead (2002:47), who do not offer a new label, but argue that 
listeners "engage musical sounds with their bodies in the creative and improvisatory process 
of understanding. Although listeners' embodied experience may involve little or no visible 
movement, their performative enaction of musical meaning has an intercorporeal dimen-
sion." 
23. A listener's responses need not be strictly mimetic, however. Even our descriptions of 
music as "moving" (ascending passages, accelerating tempi, etc.) illustrate the extent to 




corresponding motions. Because this connection already exists, musical lines that accelerate, 
descend, ascend, or follow any other recognizable pattern of motion re-engage with listeners' 
embodied experiences of those particular movements. 
24. See, for example, Gould and McClure (1968). 
25.As Bazzana (1997:240, 247) discusses, Gould's usual microphone placement, particularly 
for the contrapuntal works he favored, was about five feet from the piano, which provided 
a closer, "drier" perspective than that demonstrated in most classical piano recordings by 
his contemporaries. 
26. It is widely accepted that art music recordings, particularly in Gould's time, embrace a 
"documentary" aesthetic (Toynbee 2000:70) in an effort to replicate the concert situation 
as closely as possible. 
27. In an essay on jazz pianist Keith Jarrett's "extraneous" singing and gesticulating that 
has many parallels with the current essay, Jairo Moreno links the types of criticisms aimed 
at Jarrett and Gould (and, I would suggest, Gould's own criticisms of his singing) with an 
abiding system of discipline within Western musical practice and discourse, that "seeks ... 
to control movement and gesture. These elements are controlled because there is in place 
a conventional belief in the role of the performer; thus the articulations and gesticulations 
of the body are part of the mechanics of reproduction, but not, perversely enough, of the 
articulation of meaning" (Moreno 1999:81). 
28. Regarding my choice of recorded sources, I ought to point out that I have sought out 
recordings in which Gould's corporealliveness is most perceptible, regardless of format. In 
some cases, the original vinyl issues have proven better sources in this regard, and in others, 
CD reissues seem to portray these elements more clearly. Further, I have listened to these 
materials both in front of a conventional stereo speaker array and through headphones 
(though in most cases, headphone listening reveals more detail than "open-air" listening). 
I have also listened to each recording with a variety of equalization settings, experimenting 
until these traces of Gould's body are most audible. I have adopted such a varied approach 
to these sources, rather than observing a strict listening methodology, in order to reflect as 
much as possible the variety of contexts in which any group of Gould listeners may encounter 
these recordings. As what I propose in this essay is a strategy for hearing corporealliveness in 
recordings, it is important to emphasize that listeners may employ their recording playback 
technology in whatever way necessary to make that corporealliveness most evident. It is 
significant, however, that often listeners must indeed work very hard to hear even faint traces 
of corporeality in recordings. This is because, in many cases, recording technicians work very 
hard themselves to scrub these sounds from recordings, precisely for the reasons outlined 
by Corbett above: the people making these recordings subscribe to a "fantasy of absolutely 
independent music." As Corbett further suggests, and as Burston (1998) clearly argues, this 
fantasy of independent music and its resulting erasure of the sounds of performing bodies 
often align with the financial interests influencing commercial musical production. 
29. Particularly audible breaths occur at 0:07, 0:26, 1:18,4:30,4:45, and 5:16 (timings refer 
to the progression of the individual variation-separately tracked on Gould 2002, Disc 
2-rather than to the progression of the entire work). 
30. I make reference in this essay both to timings in recordings and to measure numbers in 
written scores. I include measure numbers as a convenience to readers, but also with a very 
particular goal in mind: elements of liveness are not necessarily encoded in a work as it is 
represented in a score, but may very well derive-as in Gould's case-from a performer's 
physical efforts to represent that score in performance. The score, then (to appropriate 
Nicholas Cook's [2001, 2003] arguments about scores and performances), is a potential 
script for liveness. 
Paul Sanden 
31. At 0:09 in Variation 5 (Gould 2002, Disc 2), a similar vocal swell allows us momentarily 
to hear Gould's voice clearly over a rather busy piano part, which obscures his vocalizations 
throughout the rest of the variation. This increase in vocal energy indicates an embodied 
voice asserting itself over and above the sounds of what Gould would have considered the 
"music" (i.e., the pitches of the composition as played on the piano). 
32. At this particular moment in the recording (due not only to Beethoven's indications but 
also to Gould's realization of those indications), the left hand remains silent while the right 
hand ascends delicately and softly through a slowly moving sixteenth note line, to arrive, 
pianissimo, at m. 24. 
33. I adopt here the Helmholtz system of octave designation, with c beginning the octave 
below middle c, c' the octave at middle c, c" the octave above that, etc. See Grove Music Online, 
s.v. "Pitch Nomenclature" (by L. S. Lloyd and Richard Rastall), http://www.grovemusic.com/ 
(accessed June 15,2008) for further explanation. 
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